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VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
ERIN C. BLONDEL†
ABSTRACT
The victims’ rights movement argues that because the outcome of
criminal prosecutions affects crime victims, the justice system should
consider their interests during proceedings. In 2004, Congress passed
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), giving victims some rights to
participate in the federal criminal justice system. This Note probes
both the theoretical assumptions and practical implications of the
CVRA. It demonstrates that the victims’ rights movement revisits a
long-acknowledged tension between adversary adjudication and
third-party interests. It shows, however, that American law has
resolved this tension by conferring party or quasi-party status on third
parties. Despite some pro-victims rhetoric, Congress reaffirmed the
public-prosecution model when it passed the CVRA. Instead of
making victims parties or intervenors in criminal prosecutions, the
CVRA asks courts and prosecutors to vindicate victims’ interests. This
unusual posture creates substantial conflicts for courts and
prosecutors and undermines defendants’ rights. To avoid these
consequences, this Note argues, courts can interpret the CVRA’s
substantive rights narrowly. Rather than reading the CVRA as
conferring broad rights on crime victims, courts should interpret the
statute to simply require institutional courtesy toward crime victims.
This interpretation reflects victims’ nonparty status and preserves the
rights and responsibilities of courts, prosecutors, and defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
1

In Marbury v. Madison Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “The
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
2
duties in which they have a discretion.” Two centuries later, in 2004,
Congress disrupted that division of power when it passed the Crime
3
Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), forcing courts both to step beyond
deciding the rights of individuals and to second-guess executive
discretion. With this statute, Congress may have transformed federal
criminal prosecutions.
Prior to the CVRA, for example, the prosecution of Dan Rubin
for securities fraud would have been unremarkable. In March 2007,
federal prosecutors and Rubin’s defense counsel negotiated a plea
4
bargain, which the district court accepted. But two of Rubin’s
victims, Dixie Chris Omni (Omni) and RJP Investment Company
(RJP), did not like the plea agreement. Omni and RJP thought that
Rubin should pay more restitution and prosecutors should provide
5
more assistance with their civil suit against Rubin. In short,
prosecutors wanted to resolve the case, but the victims wanted to
recover their losses.
Over the objection of the government and Rubin’s defense
counsel, Omni and RJP petitioned the district court based on the
CVRA to vacate the plea agreement and modify Rubin’s restitution
6
order. They also argued that prosecutors violated their statutory
right to be treated with respect when the government contended that
Omni and RJP filed the petition merely to improve their bargaining
7
position in the civil lawsuit.

1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Id. at 170.
3. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261–65 (2004) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) and to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603(d)–(e)). This Note
refers to the act simply as the Crime Victims’ Rights Act.
4. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 441, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
5. Id. at 412–13, 416–17.
6. Id. at 412–13, 425. Under the CVRA, victims may assert their statutory rights by
petitioning the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).
7. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17, 428; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (granting victims
“[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect for [their] dignity and privacy”).
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The district judge chafed at the victims’ request to second-guess
the government and place their interests ahead of those of the parties.
He refused to “prohibit[] the government from raising legitimate
arguments . . . simply because the arguments may hurt a victim’s
8
feelings.” The court also expressed concern that “such a dispute . . . .
potentially compromis[es] its ability to be impartial to the
9
government and defendant, the only true parties to the trial.”
10
United States v. Rubin demonstrates the procedural and
practical problems that the CVRA creates for participants in the
federal criminal justice system. Traditionally, American courts have
followed the adversary system of litigation, which grants parties broad
autonomy to vindicate their rights and interests before an impartial
court. The adversary system has informed the constitutional,
procedural, and ethical rights and obligations of the system’s three
primary participants: courts, prosecutors, and defendants. But
because an adversary system relies on the parties to assert their
interests before the court, it necessarily excludes outsiders like crime
victims.
11
The victims’ rights movement has argued that excluding victims
from criminal proceedings is unjust because victims have a unique
interest in the outcome of criminal cases and so deserve the
12
opportunity to have those interests represented. But the movement
merely restates the point that both legal realists and public interest
litigators have noted: the adversary system fails to consider others
whose interests litigation may affect. This Note disagrees with the
conclusion of victims’ rights activists and other scholars that outside
interests justify changing the adversary system. Congress and the
courts can give third parties intervenor or party status, which allows

8. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
9. Id. The court continued,
As for actual clashes between victim and government over the best way to convict,
punish and seek restitution from a criminal wrongdoer, how can the court presiding
over the prosecution of the defendant referee any spat between government and
victim about how best to make the accused pay for his, at that point, only charged
criminal conduct?
Id. at 429.
10. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
11. For a brief history of the victims’ rights movement, see Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime
Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 861, 865–69.
12. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
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third parties to adjudicate their rights without disrupting the
adversary structure.
The CVRA does not confer party or intervenor status, however;
it instead reaffirms prosecutors’ responsibility to prosecute federal
criminal proceedings. Yet it asks courts and prosecutors to vindicate
the interests of victims, who remain nonparties under the statute. This
unusual procedure places courts and prosecutors at odds with their
constitutional and ethical obligations, and it undermines historic
protections for criminal defendants inherent in the adversary system.
Courts can and should interpret the CVRA narrowly to avoid these
conflicts.
Part I of this Note outlines the cultural values that underlie
adversary adjudication. It demonstrates that the adversary system—
which privileges judicial independence and party autonomy—frames
the federal criminal justice system, and it concludes that the system
excludes third parties, including victims, by design. Part II challenges
the victims’ rights movement’s assumption that the justice system
should incorporate victims even at the expense of the adversary
system. It shows that the movement has overlooked serious scholarly
objections to considering third-party interests rather than focusing on
the rights of the parties. And when it has crafted procedures to allow
third parties to represent their interests, American law has
consistently preferred to confer party status on third parties rather
than abandon the adversary structure. Part III demonstrates that the
CVRA fails to confer party status on victims. In an unprecedented
disruption of the adversary structure, the CVRA instead compels
courts and prosecutors to act as victims’ advocates, a posture that
undermines judicial independence, prosecutorial discretion, and
defendants’ rights. But courts can interpret the CVRA’s substantive
rights narrowly; by limiting the scope of victims’ rights, courts can
limit the burden on courts and prosecutors to advocate for victims
and avoid many of these improprieties. This Note concludes that
courts should interpret the CVRA as requiring institutional courtesy
toward crime victims. But until Congress makes victims independent
parties in criminal prosecutions, courts and prosecutors should not
change their decisions based on the desires of victims.
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I. THE AMERICAN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
A.

Adversary and Inquisitorial Cultures

Western cultures resolve legal disputes through one of two basic
13
approaches: the adversary model or the inquisitorial model. The
models fundamentally differ in who controls the proceedings. In the
14
inquisitorial model, the court actively directs the case. Judges in
inquisitorial systems initiate proceedings, collect evidence, and
determine how to construct and resolve the legal and factual issues in
15
the case. In contrast, parties in adversary systems manage their own
cases. They initiate proceedings, develop the evidence, and choose
16
the best way to argue their position before the court. Judges in
17
adversary systems act primarily as neutral “umpire[s].” Rather than
undertaking independent investigations, they look at the evidence the
parties bring before the court and rule on the law based on the facts
18
and arguments before them.
These procedural differences reflect cultural assumptions about
19
the purpose of legal systems. In the inquisitorial model, social
interests take primacy. These societies tend to view the legal system
20
primarily as a tool to investigate and uncover the truth. Unlike
adversary systems, which prize rules of evidence and procedure,
inquisitorial systems generally disfavor rules that might obstruct
21
uncovering the truth. For example, inquisitorial courts admit
13. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2005)
(comparing the United States’ adversary system with the “dark inquisitorial world of
continental Europe”). Although no system is completely inquisitorial or adversarial, legal
systems usually emerge from one method or the other. Id. at 1187.
14. Id. at 1188.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary
System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 320–21
& n.23 (1991).
19. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 277, 280 (2002) (arguing that the United States’ “cultural predilections are reflected in
four important aspects of civil procedure that are peculiarly American”).
20. Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton & Michael Wilson, Stranded Between Partisanship
and the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial
Systems of Justice, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 448, 462–63 (2005).
21. Id.
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evidence even if authorities improperly collected it. Inquisitorial
systems focus more on achieving the right result than on strictly
23
enforcing procedures.
In contrast, adversary systems value parties’ rights to have their
24
disputes resolved through a fair process monitored by a judge.
Although adversary systems assume that the parties’ self-interests
25
drive them to uncover the truth for the jury, these cultures
ultimately show less desire to achieve the correct result. For example,
these legal systems tend to develop firm procedural default rules that
26
outsiders may view as unfairly harsh. But protecting the process—
and thereby protecting party autonomy—justifies sacrificing some
accuracy in the outcome of the litigation.

22. Id.
23. See Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in
Adversarial Administrative Deportation Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor
Rules of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 124 n.170 (2007) (noting that under French law the
“honor and conscience,” C. PR. PÉN. art. 310(1), of judges binds them to discover the truth and
that German law allows a court to, “upon its own motion, extend the taking of the evidence to
all facts and evidence which are important for the [court’s] decision,” StPO
§ 244(2)).
24. Nagorcka et al., supra note 20, at 462–63.
25. Id. at 462.
26. Id. at 462–63. The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 2669 (2006), illustrates the tension between adversarial and inquisitorial philosophies. One
of the defendants in that case, Mario Bustillo, was a Honduran national who was prosecuted in
Virginia state court without being afforded his right under the Vienna Convention to consult
with the Honduran Consulate. Id. at 2676. Bustillo first raised this issue in a habeas corpus
petition, however, and lower courts ruled that because he raised the issue on collateral rather
than direct review, Bustillo was procedurally barred from litigating the claim. Id. at 2676–77,
2682. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) disagreed, holding that the Vienna Convention
required American courts to permit defendants to raise this issue even on collateral appeal. Id.
at 2683.
The Supreme Court rejected the ICJ’s interpretation. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice John Roberts discussed at some length the difference between inquisitorial and
adversary litigation. Id. at 2685–86. He reasoned that the ICJ overlooked the importance of
procedural default rules in adversary systems. Id. at 2686. The ICJ’s interpretation of the
Vienna Convention would allow Convention claims to “trump not only procedural default rules,
but any number of other rules requiring parties to present their legal claims at the appropriate
time for adjudication.” Id. These rules are so critical to preserving the fairness of adversary
litigation that adversary courts enforce them even at the expense of viable legal claims. See id. at
2687 (“[I]t is well established that where a defendant fails to raise a Miranda claim at trial,
procedural default rules may bar him from raising the claim in a subsequent postconviction
proceeding.”). The Court concluded that Bustillo’s claim was procedurally barred. Id.
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B. The Federal Justice System
American legal culture generally follows the adversary
27
tradition. As one scholar has explained, “[t]he framers, reacting
against the King’s autocratic judiciary, wanted both to ensure federal
judicial independence from the Executive and to vest substantial
28
adjudicatory power in the people.” As a result, adversary philosophy
has shaped the constitutional, procedural, and ethical structure of the
federal criminal justice system.
1. Federal Courts. Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests
judicial power in the federal courts to resolve the “Cases” and
29
“Controversies” before them. The cases-and-controversies principle
lays the foundation for the limited, adversary nature of the federal
justice system. As Chief Justice Marshall declared in Marbury v.
Madison, the courts resolve the rights of individuals and should not
30
intrude on the executive’s responsibility to enforce the law. This
limitation allows courts to make decisions based on “concrete legal
31
issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions,” and it grants
32
parties autonomy to vindicate their rights.
The cases-and-controversies principle also preserves the
33
separation of power between the branches of government. The
27. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 382 (1982). The American
legal system is not purely adversarial. Courts of equity, for example, are rooted in inquisitorial
procedure. Kessler, supra note 13, at 1193. But the American legal system “is considered more
adversarial than most.” Resnik, supra, at 382. And criminal cases traditionally have proceeded
in adversary common law courts, not courts of equity. Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle?
Zechariah Chafee and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 BYU L. REV. 259, 287–88; see also
Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1361, 1368 (2005) (distinguishing the “inquisitorial model of the courts of equity” from “the
adversarial mode of the common law courts”).
28. Resnik, supra note 27, at 381 (footnote omitted).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
31. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (quoting United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423 (1940)). As Justice Scalia noted, rejecting a
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, “[h]ypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a
hypothetical judgment.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
32. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments
entitling them to relief.”).
33. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1988). For example, the Court has long held
that it cannot resolve political questions because those questions implicate the policy judgments
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Supreme Court has prohibited judges from acting as policymakers
rather than independent interpreters of the law: “executive or
administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on
34
judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.” Not only
35
does a limited judiciary protect the policymaking branches, but it
also frees the judiciary to focus its attention on allowing the parties to
vindicate their rights before an impartial tribunal.
Ideally, the federal judiciary exhibits two key traits of adversary
judges: it ensures that the proceedings give both parties a fair
opportunity to present their cases, and it remains impartial toward
36
parties. First, judges bear responsibility for preserving a fair forum
for litigation. The Constitution, for example, vests significant
responsibility for protecting defendants’ constitutional rights in the
37
judiciary. Procedurally, judges manage the proceedings and regulate
38
the relationship between the parties. Second, federal judges refrain
39
from acting as advocates. Fundamental to the American ideal of a
fair forum for adjudication is the concept of the “judge as an impartial
40
guardian for the rule of law.” The federal judiciary thus exhibits the
adversary model’s emphasis on allowing individual parties the

of the other branches and are beyond courts’ Article III jurisdiction. E.g., Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am of the view that the
basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is ‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable
because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign
relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action
of the President.”).
34. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)).
35. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 230 (1990).
36. See supra notes 17–18, 24–26 and accompanying text.
37. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1014–15 (2006).
38. For example, judges regulate discovery, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d), and rule on the parties’
pretrial motions, FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)–(d).
39. Resnik, supra note 27, at 382.
40. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Federal law requires
judges to recuse themselves from a case “in which [their] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). Federal judges sometimes do actively protect the rights
of particularly vulnerable parties, such as pro se litigants. E.g., Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636,
639 (2d Cir. 2007). The purpose of these interventions is not for courts to assume advocacy
duties; the parties remain responsible for litigating their cases. See id. (asking courts to “liberally
construe [a pro se litigant’s] pleadings” but not asking the court to litigate on the pro se
plaintiff’s behalf). Courts show more leniency toward technical procedural issues to prevent
unfairly excluding nonlawyers. E.g., id. Courts act, then, to preserve the fairness of the
proceedings—a quintessentially adversary duty.
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freedom to vindicate their interests in a fair forum. As a result,
though, the federal courts exclude outsiders to the litigation,
41
including victims.
2. The Parties. With a limited judiciary, primary responsibility
42
for vindicating legal rights rests with the parties to litigation. With
43
few exceptions, federal courts still assume that “the parties know
what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and
44
arguments entitling them to relief.”
a. The Prosecution. The responsibility to enforce the United
States’ laws rests with the executive branch. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly protected the executive’s constitutional duties to
prosecute criminal offenses. The Court has held that because
prosecution is a core executive function, statutes may not
45
“impermissibly interfere” with the executive’s prosecutorial powers.
Under the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors have
46
near-absolute power to determine whether to bring criminal charges,
whether to pursue a prosecution, and how to negotiate a plea
47
bargain. Contrary to the suggestion of some victims’ rights

41. In France’s inquisitorial system, by contrast, the investigating judge may consider
outside interests such as victims, animals, minority groups, or the environment and even permit
those parties or their representatives to participate in the proceedings. Nagorcka et al., supra
note 20, at 460–61.
42. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments
entitling them to relief.”).
43. See infra Part II.C.
44. Castro, 540 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
45. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660, 659–60, 695 (1988). In Morrison, the Court found
that the statute was valid because it did not impermissibly interfere with the executive’s
prosecutorial power. Id.
46. See id. at 710–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the executive is responsible for
prosecuting criminal offenses, that the other branches have means to check that balance, and
that Congress can “impeach the executive who willfully fails to enforce the laws . . . and the
courts can dismiss malicious prosecutions” (citation omitted)); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility
v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[F]ederal courts have traditionally and, to our
knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the instance of a private person,
discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to prosecute persons regarding
whom a complaint of criminal conduct is made.”).
47. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
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48

advocates, including the CVRA’s drafters, federal prosecutors, not
victims, have carried sole responsibility to prosecute federal offenses
49
since the Judiciary Act of 1789. Federal law continues to vest all
50
prosecutorial responsibilities in United States attorneys.
Federal prosecutors represent the interests of the United States,
not the interests of victims or other specific third parties. As the
Supreme Court has observed, by representing the United States,
federal prosecutors have a responsibility to vindicate the public’s
51
interest in justice. This obligation to seek justice, though, is
“twofold”: prosecutors must ensure “that guilt shall not escape or
52
innocence suffer.” As a result, prosecutors have a duty both to the
public and to the defendant to make sure justice is done. Prosecutors’
codes of ethics generally agree that prosecutors are “ministers of
53
justice.” Additionally, prosecutors have a duty to remain impartial
54
toward private interests. Thus, federal prosecutors should consider
48. Senator Dianne Feinstein, for example, has repeatedly relied on an inaccurate history
of public prosecution in American law to justify expanding victims’ rights. Promoting a victims’
rights amendment to the Constitution, she argued that “a constitutional amendment will restore
rights that existed when the Constitution was written. It is a little known fact that at the time the
Constitution was drafted, it was standard practice for victims, not public prosecutors, to
prosecute criminal cases.” Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Crime Victims:
Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of
Sen. Dianne Feinstein). Later, when sponsoring a federal statute recognizing victims’ rights,
Senator Feinstein argued that “[v]ictims had rights until about the mid-19th century, the 1850s,
when the concept of the public prosecutor was developed in our Nation.” 150 CONG. REC.
S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). In fact, “the American system of
public prosecution was fairly well established by the time of the American Revolution.” Juan
Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 371
(1986). And victims never have prosecuted federal criminal cases. See infra note 49 and
accompanying text.
49. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 689, 700–01 (2004).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2006).
51. The Court has explained,
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
52. Id.
53. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1999) (“A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).
54. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987). In Young,
Louis Vuitton, S.A. (Louis Vuitton) settled a lawsuit against the defendants for trademark
infringement. Id. at 790. Louis Vuitton’s civil attorneys convinced the trial court to appoint
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the interests of third parties, including victims, but only in the broader
context of society’s interest in justice. They should not elevate
victims’ interests over the interests of the public, the community, and
the defendant.
b. Defendants. In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is the
prosecution’s adversary. The Constitution reflects this position: as
one scholar notes, “[o]ne of the animating features of the
Constitution is its preoccupation with the regulation of the
55
government’s criminal powers.” The number of amendments in the
Bill of Rights devoted to protecting defendants from government
authority demonstrates the Framers’ concern for ensuring that the
56
adversary process is fair. Defendants have a right to due process of
57
law; notice of charges against them; assistance of counsel;
confrontation of witnesses against them; and a fair, speedy, and public
58
trial by a jury drawn from the community.
This framework protects defendants from government conduct,
59
not the acts of private third parties outside the litigation. Given the
number of protections it affords to criminal defendants, the Bill of
Rights appears to assume that the government is the defendant’s
adversary in criminal proceedings. It does not anticipate third parties
such as crime victims presenting a challenge to the liberty of accused
defendants. Victims’ advocates therefore rightly observe that the

them to represent the United States in a later prosecution of the defendants for continuing to
infringe Louis Vuitton’s trademark. Id. at 791–92. The Supreme Court held that it was improper
to appoint the beneficiary of the court order to prosecute a contempt action claiming a violation
of the settlement agreement. Id. at 809 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
The Court observed that “[r]egardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this
case resulted in any prosecutorial impropriety . . . that appointment illustrates the potential for
private interest to influence the discharge of public duty.” Id. at 805 (majority opinion). This
influence was improper because “[t]he prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public
interest in vindication of the court’s authority. A private attorney appointed to prosecute a
criminal contempt therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who
undertakes such a prosecution.” Id. at 804.
55. Barkow, supra note 37, at 1012.
56. See id. at 1016–17 (arguing that the Bill of Rights contains structural protections for
defendants in the adversary process).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. Id. amend. VI.
59. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Colloquy Essay, A Pragmatic Defense
of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 393 n.44 (2007) (“With the exception of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Constitution does not regulate private conduct at all.”).
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traditional justice system prevents victims from representing their
60
interests in criminal cases, but this exclusion is by design.
II. MULTIPLE INTERESTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Victims’ rights proponents have joined a number of scholars
arguing that fairness requires modifying the adversary system to
consider interests beside those of the parties. Section B demonstrates
that these critics overlook another problem: if litigation considers
third-party interests, it loses focus on the rights of the actual parties.
Section C argues that American law has resolved this conflict by
conferring party-like status on third parties, allowing them to
vindicate their interests without undermining the adversary structure.
A. Criminal Justice in Adversary Proceedings
Because it proceeds according to adversary principles, the
federal criminal justice system, like all American criminal
proceedings, prizes fair process and party autonomy even at the
61
expense of a correct result. But in criminal prosecutions the stakes
are particularly high. If the outcome is incorrect, either an innocent
person loses that person’s freedom, even life, or a guilty person
escapes punishment, endangering society and leaving the victim’s
62
suffering unanswered. Criminal law is uniquely emotional as a result;
ensuring procedural fairness may seem like a minor concern when
discussing something as explosive as child rape or executing an
63
innocent person.
Some scholars and advocates have promoted distorting adversary
procedures to improve criminal prosecutions. The victims’ rights
60. E.g., Cardenas, supra note 48, at 372.
61. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
62. Interest groups devoted to reforming the system to achieve more accurate results
demonstrate the significance of this issue. For example, the Innocence Project exists both to
“free the staggering numbers of innocent people who remain incarcerated and to bring
substantive reform to the system responsible for their unjust imprisonment.” Innocence Project,
Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008). Similarly, victims’ rights groups such as the National Organization for Victim
Assistance have argued that victims have the right to protection and “reparations.” Nat’l Org.
for Victim Assistance, Crime Victim & Witness Rights, http://www.trynova.org/about/
victimrights.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
63. The tension between process and the high-stakes nature of criminal proceedings
probably in part explains the heated disagreement between the International Court of Justice
and the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. See supra note 26.

BLONDEL.DOC

10/31/2008 1:18:34 PM

2008] VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

249

movement contends that criminal cases should consider victims’
interests in addition to the government’s interests. These advocates
argue that excluding victims from the justice system, especially in light
64
of their suffering, is fundamentally unjust. At least one victims’
rights scholar has called for changing the adversary system to fully
65
vindicate victims’ interests. Other scholars, concerned that too many
defendants are wrongfully convicted, advocate greater inquisitorial
66
proceedings to protect innocent defendants.
Victims’ rights proponents, at least, have enjoyed enormous
success persuading Congress and state legislatures to incorporate
67
victims into criminal prosecutions. But pro-victim scholars and
legislators have assumed uncritically that the law should remedy the
injustice of excluding victims by incorporating them into proceedings.
In their concern for victims’ suffering, however, victims’ rights
advocates have not addressed the theoretical and practical
implications of their solution. In fact, commentators have long
recognized a core conflict between the adversary model and third68
party interests. Section B shows that scholars already have raised
important objections to undermining the adversary system to help
third parties. And Section C demonstrates that American law has

64. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(arguing, in support of the CVRA, that “[v]ictims are the persons who are directly harmed by
the crime and they have a stake in the criminal process because of that harm”); William T. Pizzi,
Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our “Adversary System,” 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 349 (noting that
“victims of violent crime have a stake in the trial that is different from that of the general public
or even the prosecutor” and calling for greater victim participation in criminal proceedings);
Judith Rowland, Illusions of Justice: Who Represents the Victim?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 177, 178 (1992) (observing that “a crime victim has an ‘interest’ in the criminal
justice process” and lamenting that only the state and the defendant have standing to participate
in criminal prosecutions).
65. Pizzi, supra note 64, at 349.
66. Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the
Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547, 550, 551 (2008) (urging “a fundamental
restructuring of the adversarial system” to “minimize the number of convictions of innocent
persons” and contending that after this change “the justice system would be more focused on
achieving a correct result in cases where a criminal defendant knows he is truly innocent and
formally pleads innocent”).
67. In addition to the CVRA, every state has passed victims’ rights legislation, and a
majority of states have amended their constitutions to recognize victims’ rights as well. Recent
Development, The Victims’ Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 526–27 (2005).
68. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67–71 (5th ed. 2003)
(describing the tension between the “private rights” and “public rights” model).
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found a different solution, one which incorporates third parties
without discarding the adversary system.
B. The Problem of Considering Nonparty Interests in Adversary
Litigation
Classical legal scholars had no reason to question excluding
victims from criminal proceedings. Adversary criminal proceedings
between the government and the prosecution solidified in the
69
nineteenth century, an era that assumed that litigation could be
70
divided into public and private law. As early as the eighteenth
century, William Blackstone declared that “[w]rongs are divisible into
71
two sorts or species; private wrongs, and public wrongs.” For
Blackstone, the quality of the wrong dictates the appropriate remedy.
Because private law protects personal rights, private citizens are
72
responsible for bringing civil suits to vindicate their interests. In
contrast, criminal offenses injure public rights, and so the king, as the
73
sovereign, bears responsibility for prosecuting public offenses. This
legal philosophy tended to view the law as rigid and rule based rather
74
than as an instrument of public policy. The public-private distinction
therefore justified public prosecutions; because criminal law’s public
nature necessitated a public remedy, the government, not victims,
logically prosecuted criminal cases.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, legal realism
75
challenged this assumption. Legal realist theory rejects the public69. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1325–26 (2002) (“[P]rivate citizens continued to initiate
and litigate criminal prosecutions in New York until the 1840s or 1850s . . . .”).
70. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (“The emergence of the market as a central legitimating institution
brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal discourse during the nineteenth
century.”).
71. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
72. Id. at *2–3.
73. 4 id. at *2.
74. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 31, 44 (1995) (explaining that nineteenth-century legal scholars viewed the law as
founded on sharp dichotomies such as public-private that dictate the “essential character” of
legal fields).
75. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1915, 1917 (2005) (“The legal realist movement flourished back in the 1920s and 30s . . . .”);
Horwitz, supra note 70, at 1426 (tracing the legal realists’ assault on the public-private
dichotomy to the 1905 Supreme Court opinion Lochner v. New York).
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private distinction; it teaches that private law affects public interests,
76
and public rules affect private life. For example, public legislation
regulating railroads, labor, and agriculture shapes the private
77
contractual relationships of parties. Public interests, such as the
78
public’s interest in avoiding nuisances, limit property owners’ rights.
And even though the family represents one of the most private areas
of an individual’s life, the family also plays a central role in shaping
79
civil society by raising future generations. As a result, the state, often
acting through a welfare agency, routinely intervenes in family life to
make sure that families are performing this role to society’s
80
standards. By showing the fallacy of the public-private distinction,
legal realism undermines a key justification for public rather than
81
private prosecutions. Legal realism agrees with victims’ rights
advocates: criminal prosecutions affect private as well as public
interests.
This brand of legal realism is essentially descriptive. But since
the 1960s and 1970s, many legal scholars have used aspects of legal
realism prescriptively. Public interest scholarship argues that because
litigation affects public interests, lawyers should use it to drive public
82
policy. Rejecting court neutrality, this theory requires courts to act
as regulatory agents, supervising complex and ongoing social policy
efforts such as reforming prisons and mental hospitals, desegregating

76. James Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller’s Public Jurisprudence of
Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 378–79 (1993).
77. Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 202–03 (1937).
78. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21–26 (1927).
79. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1356 (1982) (“It has been common forever to speak of the public functions of
the family in producing and socializing ‘the next generation.’”).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1357 (arguing that one cannot “take the public/private distinction seriously as
a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of anything”).
82. E.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 passim (1976). Professor Chayes argues that
just as the traditional concept reflected and related to a system in which social and
economic arrangements were remitted to autonomous private action, so the new
model reflects and relates to a regulatory system where these arrangements are the
product of positive enactment. In such a system, enforcement and application of law
is necessarily implementation of regulatory policy. Litigation inevitably becomes an
explicitly political forum and the court a visible arm of the political process.
Id. at 1304.
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83

schools, and improving public housing. The idea that litigation can
effect social change for group interests remains popular in American
legal culture; for example, the gay community has combated social
discrimination by litigating against the military’s “don’t-ask-don’t84
tell” policy and for judicial recognition of gay marriage. Victims’
85
rights advocacy, which also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, mirrors
public interest scholarship. Rather than using private litigation to
achieve public goals, it argues that public prosecutions should
consider private interests.
But public interest litigation has proven difficult to square with
the structural and especially the ethical culture of the adversary
86
system. Professor Derrick A. Bell, in his classic treatment of the
issue, demonstrates that lawyers litigating school desegregation cases
87
after Brown v. Board of Education often failed their ethical
88
obligations to their clients. Adversary attorneys owe their loyalty to
89
best vindicating their clients’ rights and interests —but when litigating
post-Brown desegregation cases, attorneys generally considered long90
term social policy goals rather than the client’s immediate needs. For
example, the NAACP’s attorneys and donors saw litigation as a
91
vehicle to obtain widespread racial desegregation. But by the 1970s,
some clients began to want more immediate concerns addressed
instead, such as improving educational quality or minimizing busing
92
to violent white neighborhoods. When the lawyers acted to promote
desegregation even at the expense of their clients’ interests, Bell

83. Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public
Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1266–67.
84. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1635–42 (1997).
85. Indeed, some commentators have linked the victims’ rights movement to larger social
rights’ movements of the era. E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble
with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 825 (1995) (book review).
86. See Rubenstein, supra note 84, at 1626 (observing that group litigation creates conflicts
within the group and arguing that “our current procedural and ethical rules too heavily favor
individualism alone”).
87. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 472 (1976).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., ¶ 2 (1999).
90. Bell, supra note 88, at 482–93.
91. Id. at 488–93.
92. Id. at 482.
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argues, they violated their fundamental responsibility to act as
93
adversary advocates.
Professor Bell’s article demonstrates that public interest
litigation forgets legal realism’s other lesson: just as private litigation
affects public interests, public litigation affects private interests. The
NAACP lawyers Bell critiques had noble intentions, but their
ultimate aim—to promote desegregation as educational and social
policy—did not always match the interests of their actual clients.
Because these lawyers chose to act through the adversary process
rather than by lobbying legislators or the executive branch, they
placed themselves in an impossible ethical situation. Victims’ rights
scholars have failed to acknowledge that asking the justice system to
vindicate private rather than public interests could create similar
94
ethical problems. As Chief Justice Marshall observed, adversary
litigation is designed to vindicate the rights of the parties. It becomes
difficult to do so when lawyers and the courts are representing other
interests instead.
C. Representing Multiple Interests in Adversary Proceedings
The adversary system thus creates conflict between the rights of
litigants and the interests of third parties. Victims’ rights proponents
and other scholars have proposed ignoring inconvenient aspects of
the adversary process. Although this approach is tempting,
particularly in light of the consequences of criminal prosecutions,
Professor Bell’s observations demonstrate that it overlooks important
counterarguments. This Section demonstrates that American law has
resolved the conflict between litigants and third parties differently
than these scholars have proposed. Rather than undermining
adversary litigation, American law has created a variety of procedural
devices that confer party or quasi-party status on interested third
parties or allow them to present their position to the court without
litigating the case’s merits. These solutions allow third parties to
litigate their interests without disrupting two key features of the
adversary system: party autonomy and court neutrality.

93. See id. at 472 (“[I]t is difficult to provide standards for the attorney and protection for
the client where the source of the conflict is the attorney’s ideals. . . . ‘No servant can serve two
masters . . . .’” (quoting Luke 16:13 (King James))).
94. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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The amicus curiae device allows outsiders to present legal
arguments to appellate courts without having party status. A third
party with an interest in an appellate case may ask the court or the
parties for permission to file a brief presenting relevant and useful
95
additional arguments to the court. The broadness of the standards
for filing an amicus brief is balanced by the narrowness of an amicus
curiae’s formal power. An amicus curiae only has the right, after
96
permission, to file a brief; it cannot litigate the merits of a legal
97
claim. The court retains total discretion whether and how to
98
consider the amicus brief, and the parties remain responsible for
99
shaping the issues and arguments for appeal. This device allows third
parties to share their perspective with the court without requiring the
court or the parties to change their behavior or decisions.
Third parties may obtain permission to litigate the merits of a
claim related to a civil case by intervening in the proceedings. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize two kinds of intervention.
Parties with a “cognizable legal interest” in the subject of the case
100
have a right to intervene unless one of the parties already
101
“adequately” represents that interest.
Permissive intervention
allows third parties to adjudicate additional claims they have that
102
share “common questions of law and fact” with the main case.
95. See SUP. CT. R. 37 (requiring permission either from the Court or the parties to file an
amicus curiae brief and stating that “[a]n amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the
Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable
help to the Court”); FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)–(b) (requiring an amicus curiae to obtain permission
either from the court or the parties and to file a motion with the proposed brief stating “the
movant’s interest” and “the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters
asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case”).
96. 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3975.1 (3d ed. 1999).
97. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165–66 (6th Cir. 1991).
98. See id. at 165 (“[P]articipation as an amicus . . . continues to be[] a privilege within the
sound discretion of the courts . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
99. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 127 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n amicus
curiae generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been
presented by the parties to the appeal.” (quoting Resident Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993))).
100. Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1116 (3d Cir. 1992); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (granting third parties a right to intervene if the litigation ultimately would
injure the third party’s interest in the “property or transaction that is the subject of the action”).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
102. Id. 24(b)(1)(B); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians of Okla. v. United
States, 78 Fed. Cl. 303, 304, 306 (2007).
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Intervenors are treated like the original parties and may litigate the
103
merits of their claims. The intervenor device therefore preserves the
adversary structure by treating intervenors as parties, which avoids
distorting the role of the original parties or the judge.
Some statutes simply confer party status on outsiders to
litigation. Qui tam statutes, for example, allow private citizens to
104
bring civil claims in the government’s name. The most commonly
105
litigated qui tam statute is the federal False Claims Act, under
which citizens may bring civil fraud claims in the name of the United
106
107
States. Once a citizen, called a “relator,” brings a qui tam suit, the
108
government may intervene. If the government does not intervene,
109
the relator prosecutes the case on the government’s behalf. Even if
the government does intervene, the relator remains a party to the
110
action. But the government and the relator litigate their cases
111
separately and then share in the recovery, much like coplaintiffs in
any civil proceeding.
Other procedures permit a litigant to stand in the shoes of a third
party that, for some reason, cannot vindicate its own interests. The
derivative suit allows shareholders to bring claims on behalf of a
112
corporation when the corporation’s officers and directors will not.
Because only the corporation is a party, not the shareholder as an
individual, the basic adversary structure remains. A series of Supreme
Court decisions also have relaxed the standing requirement and
permitted a litigant to vindicate the rights and interests of a third
party that cannot join an action if the litigant shares a relationship
113
with the third party. For example, defendants may raise equal
protection claims on behalf of jurors excluded from the defendant’s

103. Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
104. Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 949 (2007).
105. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 (2000).
106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2000); Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 769.
107. Broderick, supra note 104, at 952.
108. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
109. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
110. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
111. Id. §§ 3730(c), (d)(1).
112. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1:1 (2003).
113. FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 175–76.
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trial through race-based peremptory challenges. This procedure
preserves the litigant’s autonomy because the litigant chooses
whether and how to vindicate the third party’s interests. Neither the
court nor the party has a duty to litigate on the third party’s behalf.
Congress and the courts have developed a variety of methods to
permit third parties to represent their interests in Article III
litigation. Procedural rules and statutes may allow the third party to
act as an amicus curiae, intervene in the case, or simply obtain party
status. They also may allow litigants to bring a claim on behalf of a
third party. None of these devices imposes a duty on a litigant to
represent a third party’s interests even if those interests are at odds
with the litigant’s own. And none requires courts to vindicate the
rights of outsiders to the litigation without first conferring party
status. These devices therefore preserve party autonomy and judicial
independence—two critical traits of the federal justice system that the
CVRA ignores.
III. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
The CVRA provides little guidance to courts and prosecutors
incorporating the statute into federal prosecutions; as a result, the
statute’s impact on the federal justice system is uncertain. This Part
examines the statute’s text, particularly its enforcement provisions,
and concludes that the CVRA really asks for institutional courtesy
toward victims, not sweeping changes to federal prosecutions. Section
A shows that the statute’s vague rights and conflicted legislative
history leave room for interpretation. Section B argues that the
statute’s enforcement provisions fail to confer party or intervenor
status on victims, indicating that the CVRA gives victims little real
power. Instead, the CVRA requires courts and prosecutors to
vindicate victims’ interests. This procedural posture forces courts to
act as advocates—even against the accused—and forces prosecutors
to promote interests that may conflict with the government’s own.
But Section C demonstrates that many of the CVRA’s provisions
permit a much narrower interpretation. Because Congress has not
rejected the public prosecution model, and because a broad
interpretation of the CVRA could present real conflicts for courts

114. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
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and prosecutors, courts should narrowly interpret the statute to
require institutional courtesy rather than sweeping new rights.
A. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act: Statutory History and Text
Congress passed the CVRA as a compromise between victims’
rights advocates, who had fought for nearly a decade to pass a
constitutional victims’ rights amendment, and congressional
115
opponents of the proposed amendment. Because Congress rushed
to pass the statute, the legislative history supporting the CVRA is
sparse, consisting only of two floor statements by the statute’s
116
sponsors, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Jon Kyl. These floor
statements support multiple interpretations of the CVRA’s purpose,
reflecting the statute’s history as a compromise. On one hand, its
drafters took pains to stress that the rights in the CVRA “do not
117
come at the expense of defendant’s [sic] rights.” But they also
demanded that courts and prosecutors avoid “whittl[ing] down or
marginaliz[ing]” victims’ rights and “treat victims of crime with the
118
respect they deserve and . . . afford them due process.” Overall the
floor statements appear designed to appease both victims’ proponents
and skeptics of victims’ rights; as a result, the statute’s legislative
119
history and purpose leave considerable room for interpretation.
The CVRA’s ambiguous statutory text exacerbates the confusion
that this conflicted legislative history may create. The CVRA
120
developed from a proposed constitutional amendment. When it
became clear that Congress would not approve the amendment,

115. See 150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
(discussing the victims’ rights amendment’s authors’ struggles to garner support for a federal
constitutional amendment); Jon Kyl, Steven J. Twist & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their
Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 588–91 (2005) (reciting the history of
the failed proposed victims’ rights amendment).
116. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.).
117. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
118. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
119. Compare United States v. Holland, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (mem.)
(calling the CVRA “the new, mushy, ‘feel good statute’”), with United States v. Heaton, 458 F.
Supp. 2d 1271, 1272 (D. Utah 2006) (mem.) (“Congress plainly intended to give victims broad
rights to fair treatment.”).
120. See Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 323 n.3 (describing the CVRA’s origins in a proposed
victims’ rights amendment).
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victims’ rights proponents passed the measure as a statute instead.
As a result, the CVRA reads more like an amendment than a statute,
with sweeping statements of rights and no discussion of how those
rights should be implemented. It grants victims eight substantive and
procedural rights: the right to be reasonably protected from the
accused, the right to be notified of public proceedings, the right not to
be excluded from public proceedings, the right to be heard at
designated proceedings, the right to proceedings free from
unreasonable delay, the right to confer with the prosecution, the right
to restitution as permitted by law, and the right to be treated with
122
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy. Nowhere does the
statute state how these rights should affect courts’ and prosecutors’
decisions during criminal proceedings.
The CVRA also fails to explain another important detail: how
courts and prosecutors should recognize victims’ rights when
prosecutors have not yet brought criminal charges. It defines “victim”
as a person who is “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of
123
Columbia.” Although the statute does not define “offense,” its
legislative history and plain language appear to confer victim status
124
even if the government has not brought charges.
It is odd that a statute with such broad language and expansive
application provides no guidance to the courts and prosecutors who
actually apply it to federal prosecutions. The explanation for this
omission is probably political: passing the CVRA presented an
opportunity to help crime victims, a broadly sympathetic group. In its
121. Id.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2006).
123. Id. § 3771(e). For a discussion of the difficulty of determining who is a “victim” within
the meaning of the statute, see United States v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561–67 (E.D. Va.
2006) (mem.).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (allowing a victim to seek a writ of mandamus for denial of
any statutory rights “if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which
the crime occurred”); 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(claiming to have written “an intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve
to have their rights protected, whether or not they are the victim of the count charged”). The
practical difficulties of this interpretation have led the Department of Justice to apply the
CVRA only to charged conduct. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 9 (2005), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/final.pdf (“[A] victim is ‘a person directly and proximately harmed
as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia’ . . .
if the offense is charged in federal district court.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)).
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haste to pass popular legislation, however, Congress did not bother
considering the CVRA’s practical implications. As a result, Congress
passed a statute that—probably unintentionally—conflicts with the
basic structure of the federal criminal justice system.
B. Enforcing the CVRA in an Adversary System
1. The CVRA’s Enforcement Provisions. Its drafters claimed that
the CVRA “mak[es] victims independent participants in the criminal
125
justice process” and gives victims the chance to enforce their
126
participation rights. But the CVRA does not change federal
prosecutors’ constitutional and statutory responsibilities to enforce
federal criminal law. The statute expressly states that it does not
127
infringe prosecutorial discretion. And nowhere does the CVRA
128
suggest that it confers party or even intervenor status on victims.
The government and the defendant thus remain the sole parties to
criminal prosecutions.
Because victims have no formal status under the CVRA, courts
and prosecutors ultimately bear responsibility to vindicate victims’
interests. Under the CVRA, trial courts must ensure that victims are
129
afforded their statutory rights. Government officials, including
prosecutors, must “make their best efforts to see that crime victims
130
are notified of, and accorded,” their rights under the CVRA.
Victims and their legal representatives may petition a district court
and then an appellate court if they are not being accorded their
131
rights. But the plain language of the statute requires courts and
prosecutors to protect victims’ rights before the victim files a
petition—the victim may petition for enforcement if courts and
prosecutors fail their obligations. The CVRA thus turns courts and
prosecutors into victims’ advocates. In contrast, victims only have
indirect power to influence the system. They cannot seek party or
125. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).
126. The CVRA is the first enforceable victims’ rights statute in the federal system. 150
CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
128. See United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“So far as the
Court can divine, however, victims in this posture are not accorded formal party status, nor are
they even accorded intervenor status as in a civil action.”).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1).
130. Id. § 3771(c)(1).
131. Id. §§ 3771(d)(1), (3).
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intervenor status; only the court, prosecutors, and defendants remain
direct participants.
Congress could have made victims substantial participants to
criminal proceedings. The CVRA could have made victims coparties
with the government, like qui tam plaintiffs, or it could have created
an intervenor posture in criminal cases, as it did in civil cases. More
radically, Congress could have abandoned the public prosecution
system and asked victims to prosecute criminal cases, or it could have
made prosecutors representatives of the victim rather than the public,
similar to plaintiffs in derivative suits. At best, by giving victims the
right “to be heard” on limited subjects, Congress probably made
victims little more than amici curiae. Like amici curiae, then, victims
remain nonparties to criminal proceedings with no right to litigate the
merits of a criminal case.
Victims’ proponents might argue that Congress would not draft
such a narrow statute. But the CVRA suggests why Congress created
an enforcement provision that fundamentally gives victims very little
power: perhaps Congress simply was unwilling to abandon the
existing public prosecution model. By restricting victim participation
and reaffirming prosecutorial discretion, Congress expressed its
preference that the executive, not victims, prosecute criminal cases.
But as the rest of this Section indicates, placing the burden instead on
courts and prosecutors to vindicate victims’ rights may upset the basic
structure of the federal criminal justice system.
2. Courts. Enforcing victims’ interests can place courts at odds
132
with the parties. For example, in In re Dean, prosecutors were
investigating whether to bring criminal charges against BP Products
North America (BP) after an explosion at a refinery that BP owned
133
killed fifteen people. The government and the district court agreed
that given the publicity surrounding the case and the possibility of
prejudicing BP, the government did not need to confer with the
134
victims. Prosecutors argued that communicating with victims would
135
“impair the plea negotiation process.” The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that prosecutors had to confer with victims,

132. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
133. Id. at 392.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting federal prosecutors).
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although it refused to compel the trial court to reject the plea
136
agreement. Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, a trial court
would have to force victim participation in plea negotiations over the
objections of the parties and despite concerns that victim
participation would prejudice the defendant. And by the plain terms
of the CVRA, the court would have to do so even if the victim did not
first object. Thus the CVRA disrupts the most fundamental division
of responsibility in adversary litigation: it does not rely on a party to
the litigation to vindicate that party’s rights (or even to vindicate an
outsider’s rights on the outsider’s behalf); instead, it asks courts to
vindicate the rights and interests of a nonparty.
The CVRA also places courts in conflict with prosecutors’
137
statutory and constitutional discretion. The core of the Rubin case
was a dispute between prosecutors, who wanted to resolve the case,
and the victims, who wanted to recover as much of their loss through
138
restitution and civil damages as possible. Because Omni and RJP
were not parties, they demanded that the court vindicate their
interest in recovery at the expense of the government’s right, as a
party, to litigate its case. The Rubin victims therefore asked the court
to infringe an adversary party’s autonomy. And because the party was
the government exercising an executive function, the Rubin victims
were fundamentally asking the court to overlook prosecutors’
statutory and constitutional responsibilities to prosecute federal
crimes. Federal courts, generally reluctant to interfere with
prosecutorial discretion, have an obligation under the CVRA to
second-guess prosecutors’ decisions on behalf of a nonparty with no
right to adjudicate the case.
The Rubin decision highlighted another problem for courts
enforcing victims’ rights: victims’ interests often conflict with the
rights and interests of the accused, placing courts in the
uncomfortable position of vindicating a victim’s rights while the

136. Id. at 395. The appellate court stated that the trial court could decide what weight, if
any, to give the victims’ absence from negotiations when deciding whether to accept the plea
agreement. Id. In July 2008, the Supreme Court refused to stay enforcement of the plea
agreement. Dean v. U.S. Dist. Court, 128 S. Ct. 2996, 2996 (2008).
137. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
138. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (reporting that
Omni and RJP argued that “the government has not provided information with which to pursue
restitution in this case and in their civil suit” and that “the government submitted on behalf of
victims a restitution claim . . . that significantly undervalues their loss”).
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accused continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. This duty
clashes with a court’s responsibility to protect defendants’ rights
140
during criminal proceedings. In Rubin, for example, the victims
wanted the court to increase restitution over the objection of the
141
prosecution and the defense. Their petition created two problems
for the court. First, when asked to vindicate victims’ rights, the court
had to assume that the victims had suffered at the hands of the
defendant—an assumption that directly conflicts with the
142
presumption of innocence. Second, the victims wanted the court to
step beyond its neutrality, a core aspect of adversary judging, and
encourage the prosecution to make the plea agreement harsher for
the defendant. As the Rubin court aptly summarized, “[i]t is hard to
comprehend, in any case, how a court presiding over the prosecution
of a defendant could engage in sidebar dispute resolution between a
victim and the government regarding the strategic decisions of the
government about the very prosecution the Court is to try
143
impartially.”
3. Prosecutors. Prosecutors have an ethical responsibility to
vindicate the public’s interest in ensuring just enforcement of the
144
United States’ criminal laws. But the CVRA asks prosecutors to
145
make their “best efforts” to enforce victims’ rights. Although the
146
statute disclaims any infringement on prosecutorial discretion, it
139. One district court explained the conundrum:
The CVRA defines a “crime victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as
a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of
Columbia.” At this stage of the case, however, the defendant continues to enjoy a
presumption that he is innocent of the charge that he committed a Federal offense.
Strictly speaking, then, I might be constrained to presume that there is no person who
meets the definition of “crime victim” in this case. That syllogism—which renders the
CVRA inapplicable to this or any other criminal case unless and until the defendant
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—produces an absurd result that I must
presume Congress did not intend. Nevertheless, I cannot ignore the possibility that by
requiring me to afford rights to “crime victims” in this case, the CVRA may
impermissibly infringe upon the presumption of Turner’s innocence.
United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.) (citation omitted)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2006)).
140. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
141. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 412–13.
142. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 325–26.
143. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 427–28.
144. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
145. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (2006).
146. Id. § 3771(d)(6).
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does give victims the “reasonable right to confer” with the
147
prosecution. The CVRA also allows prosecutors to petition the
district and appellate courts for relief if victims are not afforded their
148
rights.
Representing victims’ private interests creates an ethical conflict
for prosecutors as soon as the victims’ interests diverge from those of
149
the public. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., the
Supreme Court discussed the conflict that prosecutors face when
representing private interests during a criminal proceeding:
A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported
prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards for
the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to
abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits
to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against
150
criminal charges.

Young addressed the appointment of a private attorney whose client
had a financial stake in the outcome of the proceedings to prosecute a
151
criminal contempt case. Although the CVRA does not make victims
the clients of federal prosecutors, as was the situation in Young, it
does appear to ask prosecutors to consider victims’ interests in a new
or more significant light. And as Rubin demonstrated, victims may
have financial interests—or even simply emotional interests—that
drive them to demand harsher treatment of defendants than the
prosecutor may consider wise. Had the prosecutors in Rubin assisted
Omni and RJP with their efforts to recover their financial losses
criminally and civilly, the prosecutors would have verged on
committing the very improprieties the Young Court denounced.
And like the courts, prosecutors’ ethical responsibilities include
152
seeking justice for all parties, including the accused. For example, in
Dean, the trial court granted an ex parte order for the government
relieving it of its responsibilities to notify and confer with the victims
of the BP explosion because, given the high-profile nature of the case,
“any public notification of a potential criminal disposition resulting
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. § 3771(a)(5).
Id. § 3771(d)(1).
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
Id. at 805.
For a discussion of the facts in the Young case, see supra note 54.
See supra Part I.B.2.a.

BLONDEL.DOC

264

10/31/2008 1:18:34 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:237
153

from the government’s investigation . . . would prejudice BP.” The
Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court’s conclusion that ordering the
government to disclose the existence of its investigation would
154
infringe prosecutorial discretion. But the Fifth Circuit did not
address the ethical problem prosecutors faced—by acting cautiously
to protect BP’s rights, the government was fulfilling its duty to the
public interest. When prosecutors place the rights of victims, who are
not even parties to the litigation, before the rights of defendants, who
enjoy substantial constitutional protections, they appear to violate—
or at least undermine—their ethical duty to defendants.
Because the CVRA does not infringe or modify prosecutors’
statutory and constitutional duties to enforce criminal law, the statute
forces prosecutors to vindicate victim’s interests while representing
the government’s interests—even if they conflict. None of the devices
discussed in Part II.C asked a party to litigate interests that conflicted
with its own goals. Unless the CVRA is nothing more than a
reminder that prosecutors should consider victims’ interests when
155
deciding how the government should proceed,
it is an
unprecedented infringement of party autonomy and prosecutorial
discretion.
4. Defendants. Finally, the CVRA places defendants in the
difficult position of combating a nonparty whose interests are
generally opposed to their own. For example, in United States v.
156
Tobin, the New Hampshire Democratic Party (NHDP) claimed that
it was a victim of the defendant’s efforts to jam phone lines set up to
157
facilitate NHDP’s “get out the vote” campaign. The government
and defense jointly moved to continue the trial until December,
158
2005 —after November elections. The NHDP argued that the
extension violated its rights under the CVRA and asked the court to

153. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 21, 2008)).
154. Id.
155. For a discussion of how prosecutors may consider victims’ interests, see supra Part
I.B.2.a.
156. United States v. Tobin, No. 04-cr-216-01-SM (D.N.H. July 22, 2005).
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 1.
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159

reject the extension. The court observed that it could not “deprive
either criminal defendants or the government of a full an [sic]
adequate opportunity to prepare for trial. The defendant’s right to
adequate preparation is, of course, of constitutional significance as
160
well.” The court prioritized the parties’ rights over the victim’s
desire to proceed to trial prior to election day. But under the CVRA,
which grants victims both the right to proceedings free from
161
162
unreasonable delay and quasi–due process rights, courts could
accelerate proceedings to the detriment of the defendant’s right to
prepare a case.
This posture conflicts with the defendant’s position as an
adversary to the government, which even the Bill of Rights recognizes
163
as a particularly delicate position. Although prosecutors have an
ethical responsibility to defendants, the courts remain primarily
responsible for protecting defendants’ statutory and constitutional
164
rights during criminal proceedings. And because the CVRA does
not make victims parties to the proceedings, courts must step in and
represent victims’ interests even when they conflict with defendants’
interests. But courts are not litigants—they are responsible for ruling
on legal questions, including whether the government’s conduct has
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendants therefore
have no way to challenge the court’s representation of the victims’
interests during the proceedings. The CVRA therefore not only
conflicts with courts’ responsibilities to protect defendants’ rights; it
also makes the court, responsible for ensuring fairness to both parties,
the adversary of the defendant.
C. Interpreting the CVRA
Congress may have tried to protect prosecutorial discretion by
refusing to confer party status on victims, but it created other
problems for courts and prosecutors by forcing them to advocate for
victims’ interests. This Section argues that a careful, narrow reading
of the CVRA’s rights provisions could avoid many of these conflicts.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7) (2006).
See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.2.b.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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165

This Section presents six statutory provisions that could either give
the victim a substantial voice in prosecutions or simply ask courts and
prosecutors to show courtesy toward victims without changing their
decisionmaking processes. Courts should adopt this narrower reading
to preserve the public prosecution model that Congress refused to
abandon.
First, the provision giving victims the right “to be treated with
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy” could
justify giving victims broad rights to influence many stages of the
166
criminal prosecution. The CVRA’s drafters asked courts and
167
prosecutors to read this right expansively. The drafters explained
that “[t]he broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be
rights themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational,” and
they argued that “the right to be treated with fairness” includes “the
notion of due process,” but they did not explain how they intended
168
the right to operate in practice. As some commentators have
already contended, loose language like “fairness” and “respect” could
confer sweeping new rights throughout the federal criminal justice
169
system.
But this right also could simply ask courts and prosecutors to
show consideration to victims as long as doing so does not come at

165. This Section does not discuss a victim’s right to notification of public proceedings, 18
U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2), and not to be excluded from public proceedings, id. § 3771(a)(3), because
those rights are relatively straightforward and present fewer ethical problems for courts and
prosecutors.
166. Id. § 3771(a)(8).
167. Senator Kyl argued that “[i]t is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled
down or marginalized by the courts or the executive branch.” 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
168. Id. at S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also id. (statement of
Sen. Feinstein) (agreeing with Senator Kyl).
169. For example, Professor Paul Cassell has argued that
[t]he CVRA requires fundamental changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The CVRA makes crime victims participants in the criminal justice
process and commands in sweeping terms that the courts must treat victims “with
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” To faithfully
implement that directive, it is necessary to assess each of the existing rules against a
fairness standard and then make changes and additions where the Rules do not
guarantee fair treatment to victims.
Cassell, supra note 11, at 872 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(a)(8)).
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the expense of the participants’ rights and duties.
This
interpretation would make more sense in light of the CVRA’s failure
171
to create anything approaching party status for victims. If Congress
wanted to preserve prosecutorial discretion but also incorporate
172
victims into the system, perhaps reading this right as a reminder to
courts and prosecutors that they should treat victims thoughtfully best
reflects the compromise that led to the statute’s enactment.
Another potentially groundbreaking provision grants victims
173
“[t]he right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay,”
recognizing that victims have an interest in rapid proceedings
independent from prosecutors and the accused. The CVRA’s drafters
claimed that this provision “does not curtail the government’s need
for reasonable time to organize and prosecute its case” or “infringe
174
on the defendant’s due process right to prepare a defense.” Instead,
this right was intended to require courts to reject motions to continue
proceedings made only for the convenience of the parties that go
175
beyond either party’s need to prepare. The statute provides no
further guidance explaining when proceedings are unreasonably
delayed.
Courts could read this statute strictly and accelerate the case
over the objection of the parties, or courts could rely on the drafters’
acknowledgement that the parties have a right to fully prepare their
cases and rarely, if ever, hasten the proceedings on the victim’s
176
behalf. To avoid interfering with the parties’ rights to choose how to
litigate their cases, courts should follow the latter approach. The
CVRA does not make victims parties, and so victims should not have

170. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing
to “prohibit[] the government from raising legitimate arguments in support of its opposition to a
motion simply because the arguments may hurt a victim’s feelings or reputation”).
171. See supra Part III.B.1.
172. See supra Parts III.A–B.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7). The purpose of this provision was to vindicate the victim’s
interest in repose. See 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(“It is not right to hold crime victims under the stress and pressure of future court proceedings
merely because it is convenient for the parties or the court.”).
174. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
175. Id.
176. See United States v. Tobin, No. 04-cr-216-01-SM, slip op. at 4 (D.N.H. July 22, 2005)
(“Although the [victim’s] interest in having this case proceed forthwith is important, of equal
importance is the court’s duty to ensure that both the defendant and government receive due
process and a fair trial.”).
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a real voice in determining the pace of litigation; nor should courts
represent that voice against the government and the accused. One
court observed,
This litigation may be proceeding with less speed than the [victim]
would prefer, given its own discrete interests, but it is worthwhile to
reflect on the old adage that the wheels of justice grind slowly, but
they grind exceedingly fine. The alternative – precipitous spinning of
the powerful wheels of justice merely to satisfy popular demand –
runs the unacceptable risk of those wheels running over the rights of
both the accused and the government, and in the end, the people
177
themselves.

The victim’s “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
178
Government in the case” also may threaten the government’s
autonomy. Although the CVRA preserves prosecutorial discretion,
this provision has led many victims to ask courts to reject plea
agreements or vacate guilty pleas on the ground that the victims did
179
not sufficiently confer with the prosecution regarding the plea.
Confronted with this situation, the Fifth Circuit proposed reading the
statute to ask prosecutors to converse with victims “before ultimately
180
exercising [their] broad discretion.” Although the CVRA’s drafters
181
claimed that “[t]his right is intended to be expansive,” the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation conforms to the drafters’ floor statements on
182
the issue. By asking prosecutors to communicate with victims
without necessarily changing their decisionmaking based on the
victim’s interests, the Fifth Circuit’s approach avoids forcing
prosecutors to represent conflicting interests and avoids placing
courts in the awkward position of second-guessing prosecutors’
177. Id.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
179. E.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
180. Id. at 395. The Fifth Circuit decided that the district court should not have exempted
prosecutors from this requirement, but it concluded that the injury to victims was not sufficient
to warrant mandamus relief. Id.
181. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); 150 CONG.
REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
182. Senator Feinstein explained that this right is expansive in the sense that it applies at
“any critical stage or disposition of the case.” 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). Prosecutors merely “should consider it part of their profession to
be available to consult with crime victims about concerns the victims may have which are
pertinent to the case, case proceedings or dispositions.” Id. at S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Kyl).
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decisions. This provision should encourage prosecutors to act
courteously toward victims while continuing to represent the United
States’ interests.
Some CVRA provisions ultimately reinforce existing law without
creating new rights. “The right to be reasonably protected from the
183
accused” is a particularly ambiguous provision. Although even
Senator Kyl recognized that “the government cannot protect the
crime victim in all circumstances,” he did not explain in what
184
circumstances the right should apply. Victims could demand federal
protection based on this provision. The Rubin victims argued that
because the government investigated, arrested, and placed Rubin on
bond while he was defrauding them, Omni and RJP were denied their
185
rights under this provision. But the Rubin court found a limiting
principle in the statutory text: it concluded that because Rubin had
not been “accused” of defrauding Omni and RJP at that time, they
had no rights under the CVRA “beyond that of general law to be
186
protected from criminal conduct by Rubin or anyone else.”
Even once the defendant is formally charged, however, it is not
clear what responsibilities this provision creates. The CVRA’s
drafters argued it requires protection for victims when courts place
187
defendants on release. Yet existing federal release law already
considers victim safety, and so this provision does not appear to
188
contribute new rights. Courts could grant release less often or with
harsher terms based on this right, particularly if they considered it
189
with the victim’s right to be heard on the issue of release. But the
CVRA’s plain text does not require them to do so, and forcing a court
to change its decision about whether to grant freedom to the accused
based on the interests of a nonparty would conflict with the court’s
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1).
184. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
185. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
186. Id. at 420.
187. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
188. One district court interpreting the CVRA observed as much:
Regardless of what this right might entail outside the bail context, it appears to add
no new substance to the protection of crime victims afforded by the Bail Reform Act,
which already allows a court to order reasonable conditions of release or the
detention of an accused defendant to “assure . . . the safety of any other person.”
United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.) (alteration in
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) (2000)).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006).

BLONDEL.DOC

270

10/31/2008 1:18:34 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:237

role as protector of a defendant’s rights. The drafters’ other
statements about this provision counsel a more limited reading. Aside
from the release issue, Senator Kyl simply asked courts to reasonably
“provide[] accommodations such as a secure waiting area, away from
190
the defendant.” Senator Kyl appears to ask courts to be courteous.
This reading allows courts to remain impartial, particularly toward
the defendant, and it prevents imposing on courts general
responsibility to ensure that federal law enforcement and federal
prosecutors are providing protection for victims.
Another provision that fundamentally restates existing law is
191
“[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.” The
CVRA’s drafters endorsed a definition of restitution that includes
compensating the victim’s family for the victim’s lost future income in
192
homicide cases. This provision contributes to criminal proceedings,
193
then, by clarifying existing law. But because the CVRA recognizes
194
the right to restitution “as provided in law,” courts uniformly have
concluded that the CVRA does not change victims’ access to
195
restitution.
Many of these interpretations appear to give victims no real right
to participate in the proceedings, which the CVRA’s drafters claimed
196
was the statute’s purpose. But one provision could give victims an
opportunity to participate without upsetting the role of the court or
the rights of the parties. The CVRA gives victims the right to be
“reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court

190. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6).
192. See 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (endorsing
two decisions by Judge Cassell, then on the District Court of Utah, that interpreted federal
restitution statutes to include lost future income).
193. See United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1302–04 (D. Utah. 2004) (mem.)
(interpreting the language and legislative intent of existing federal restitution statutes to
authorize lost income restitution in homicide cases).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6).
195. E.g., In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563–64 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming
the establishment of a restitution fund that did not fully compensate all victims because the
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act allows courts to limit restitution when the number of victims
makes full compensation difficult); United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871–72, 875 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (mem.) (concluding that the CVRA could not overcome the abatement doctrine,
which required vacation of Kenneth Lay’s conviction because he could not appeal his conviction
after his death).
196. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
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involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”
Senator Kyl argued that it makes victims “independent participant[s]”
198
and ensures that they may give victim impact statements. Federal
statues already permit victim impact evidence during some sentencing
199
proceedings, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow
200
victims of violent or sexual crimes to address the court. But the
CVRA appears to be the first federal statute to confer a general right
201
on victims of all federal crimes to speak to the court at sentencing,
expanding the role of controversial victim impact evidence in federal
202
criminal proceedings.
The CVRA does not explain how much weight, if any, courts
should give victims’ opinions. Courts could use this provision to
justify imposing harsher release terms or sentences. On the other
hand, as the Sixth Circuit observed, it is not clear “why the particular
desires of [the] victim should affect the legal analysis necessary for
203
sentencing” the defendant. Courts could treat victims essentially
like amici curiae, because, like amici curiae, victims have no clear

197. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).
198. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
199. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(d) (2006) (copyright infringement); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2006)
(capital sentencing).
200. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B).
201. Lower courts disagree whether the CVRA gives victims the right to speak or to simply
present their perspective in writing. Compare United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745,
748 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (mem.) (“[T]he statute requires only that a victim be reasonably heard,
and . . . Congress’s use of that term of art does not require that a trial court accept oral
statements in all situations.”), with Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir.
2006) (“The statements of the sponsors of the CVRA and the committee report for the
proposed constitutional amendment disclose a clear congressional intent to give crime victims
the right to speak at proceedings covered by the CVRA.”). The CVRA’s drafters, however,
intended for victims to have the right to speak. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
202. Many commentators have criticized victim impact evidence as inflammatory and
prejudicial. E.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 395 (1996) (“Victim impact statements evoke . . . a complex set of emotions directed
toward the defendant, including hatred, fear, racial animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated
vengeance, and the desire to purge collective anger.” (footnote omitted)); Janice Nadler &
Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 419, 426 (2003) (arguing that victim impact evidence “diverts the jury’s attention away
from the crime and the defendant and toward the character of the victim and the crime’s effect
on his family”).
203. United States v. Hughes, No. 06-6461, 2008 WL 2604249, at *7 n.7 (6th Cir. June 26,
2008).
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statutory right to have their arguments considered. Victims still could
have the satisfaction of expressing their feelings without necessarily
affecting the court’s decisionmaking, avoiding conflicts for the judges
and prosecutors who otherwise would have to treat the defendant
more harshly. And if Congress has not given victims the right to
adjudicate their interest in harsher treatment of defendants, then
courts should not use vague language about a right to be heard to
create it.
Some might object that interpreting the CVRA this narrowly
eviscerates the statute. But this reading still requires the federal
justice system to incorporate victims; it simply avoids making them
independent parties. After the CVRA, victims may express their
204
opinions to prosecutors and, during some proceedings, to the court.
The CVRA also makes it more difficult for courts to exclude victims
205
from public court proceedings, and it requires prosecutors to notify
206
victims of those public proceedings in advance. In short, the CVRA
allows victims to witness some proceedings, talk to prosecutors, and
communicate with the court. These rights still respect victims’ unique
investment in the proceedings. But narrowly interpreting the CVRA
makes sense in light of Congress’s refusal to replace the publicprosecution model. Limiting victims’ influence over the prosecution
matches their lack of formal party status, and it generally avoids many
problems that forcing courts and prosecutors to advocate for crime
victims creates. If Congress wishes to make victims parties, it may do
so. Until then, courts should tread carefully before reading the
CVRA too broadly.
CONCLUSION
This Note probes whether some ends justify the means necessary
to achieve them. Victims’ rights scholars have argued, with
considerable political success, that it is worth changing the means of
criminal justice—the traditional adversary process between the

204. See supra notes 178–82, 196–202 and accompanying text.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3) (2006) (requiring courts to find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a victim’s presence at a public proceeding would “materially alter[]” the victim’s
testimony before excluding the victim from the courtroom). This provision contrasts with the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally allow courts total discretion to exclude witnesses
from the courtroom. FED. R. EVID. 615.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2).

BLONDEL.DOC

10/31/2008 1:18:34 PM

2008] VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

273

government and the defendant—to promote the victim’s well-being.
Their arguments echo an old debate among legal scholars about the
adversary system’s effect on third-party interests. It also probes one
of the most vexing problems of criminal justice: with so much at stake,
why not manipulate procedure to ensure a better outcome for victims,
defendants, or the public at large?
But valuing the right result over the right process has
consequences. Because American law continues to follow the
adversary tradition, promoting essentially inquisitorial values
undermines the way American procedure actually operates. The
CVRA’s potential effect on the federal criminal justice system
illustrates this problem. It places courts in the awkward position of
second-guessing prosecutorial discretion and vindicating victims’
interests against the rights of criminal defendants. Prosecutors also
must represent victims in criminal proceedings, undermining
prosecutors’ traditional role as ministers of justice and forcing them
to vindicate interests that may conflict with the government’s own.
And defendants rely on courts and, to a lesser extent, prosecutors to
protect their constitutional rights, a protection that the CVRA may
enervate.
American law has developed a number of solutions for the
conflict between the adversary process and third-party interests.
Some devices, like the amicus curiae devices, allow third parties to
present their position without giving third parties power to vindicate
their rights vis-à-vis the real parties. Otherwise, American law has
either conferred some kind of party or intervenor status on third
parties or asked a litigant to stand in the third party’s shoes before the
court. None of the devices presented in this Note requires the court to
vindicate the interests of nonparties or forces litigants to represent
interests contrary to their own.
The CVRA does not confer party or intervenor status on crime
victims. Despite some pro-victim rhetoric, Congress explicitly
preserved the public-prosecution model and claimed that the statute
did not affect defendants’ rights. In short, even Congress was
unwilling to change the fundamental structure of the justice system to
promote victims’ interests. Both victims’ nonparty status and the
limited nature of many of the CVRA’s substantive rights demonstrate
Congress’s reluctance to upset the status quo.
This Note proposes a way to interpret the CVRA that remains
true to the statute’s text and generally avoids disrupting the basic
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structure of the federal adversary process. Rather than conferring
broad rights on crime victims, courts and others should simply show
courtesy and respect toward crime victims. They should allow victims
to attend public proceedings and share their thoughts. They should
communicate with victims and remember them when release or
restitution law requires it. But courts and prosecutors should not
change their decisionmaking for victims. By observing this distinction,
they can implement the statute that Congress crafted and the justice
system demands.

